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In 2010, the shine came off  the G20 (Bosco 2010). When the G20 leaders convened for the summit in 
Seoul, there was deep conflict and tension on issues of  global imbalances. Suddenly, the “fellowship of  the 
lifeboat” that impressed observers in the first acute phases of  the financial crisis appeared to have 
disappeared (Wade and Vestergaard 2010). To many the Seoul summit was thus the real test of  the G20: 
the outcome of  the Seoul summit would show whether the G20 had any relevance [find quote]. Most 
expected a disappointing result. A week before the summit, Gideon Rachman (2010) concluded that the 
G20 had already proven itself  to be not only illegitimate but also ineffective As it turned out, the Seoul 
summit met the expectations: nothing came out of  it on the key issues. The G20 had shown “how not to 
run the world” (FT 2010). In the views of  many, the self-declared steering committee for the global 
economy had failed. 
Often, issues of  legitimacy and effectiveness are thought of  in terms of  a trade-off: more legitimacy, less 
effectiveness – and vice versa. The current paper is based on the reverse assumption: that in matters of  
global economic governance, legitimacy and effectiveness go hand in hand. The paper therefore sets out to 
identify the main legitimacy problems of  the G20, and uses this analysis as the basis for reviewing and 
discussing possible future modes of  global economic governance.  
In analyzing the legitimacy problems of  the G20, the paper focuses particularly on matters of  inclusion 
and exclusion. It is stressed that the existing membership is based on no objective criteria and by 
implication that the member countries are by no means simply the twenty largest countries of  the world. 
The G20 claims that its “economic weight and broad membership gives it a high degree of  legitimacy and 
influence over the management of  the global economy and financial system” (G20 2010a). The G20’s 
claim to “represent” the world in the sense that its members account for a high proportion of  global 
population and gross domestic product is deeply problematic, however. In a setting where the majority of  
countries have no voice and influence, any claim to ‘representational’ legitimacy is less than convincing. 
The permanent exclusion of  172 countries violates the principle of  universality, a fundamental principle of  
liberal internationalism and indeed of  international cooperation since the Second World War. Particularly 
troubling is the fact that only one African country is included in the G20 membership and that not one 
single low-income country is represented.  
Criticisms of  the illegitimacy of  the G20 have given rise to various proposals to revise its membership. The 
paper discusses two such revisionist approaches and concludes that they only marginally enhance the 
legitimacy of  the G20 as a body of  global economic governance. The paper instead advocates a 
fundamental reform of  the existing Bretton Woods system, including the creation of  a Global Economic 
Council in order to address the global leadership role assumed in recent years by the G20 with limited 
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success. Being firmly embedded in the Bretton Woods system, while fundamentally reshaping its 
governance structures to reflect the geopolitical realities of  the 21st century, this Global Economic Council 
would be a legitimate steering committee of  the global economy; the pinnacle of  a new model for global 
economic governance.  
The paper first briefly outlines the history of  the G20 (section 1), and then reviews its membership in 
terms of  the key patterns of  inclusion and exclusion (section 2). This is followed by a discussion of  two 
revisionist approaches to G20 reform, and an account of  the actual steps taken by the G20 to 
accommodate criticism of  its illegitimacy (section 3). The paper then suggests that effective global 
economic governance will require moving beyond the G20 (section 4) and outlines an institutional 
framework considered expedient towards that end, which is predicated upon a fundamental reshaping of  
the Bretton Woods system (section 5). The paper ends with a few concluding remarks (section 6). 
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THE ORIGIN OF THE G20 
The G20 first emerged in the wake of  the financial crisis in Asia in 1999, as an informal finance ministers 
and central bank governors’ forum. On 25 September 1999, the G7 finance ministers and central bank 
governors announced that they had decided to “broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy 
issues” (G20 2008: 8). The G7 countries hence decided to invite their “counterparts from a number of  
systemically important countries from regions around the world” and the first G20 meeting was held a few 
months later, in Berlin. The communiqué of  the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors 
reiterated the intention stated by the G7 in its September meeting:  
The G20 was established to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the 
Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the discussions on key economic and financial policy issues 
among systemically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable 
world economic growth that benefits all (G20 2008: 63). 
This statement is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is striking that the G20 is conceived as an 
information dialogue within the framework of  the Bretton Woods system. A decade later, many would see the 
relationship between the G20 summits and the Bretton Woods system as, at best, antagonistic and 
ambiguous. Second, the statement is remarkable for its reference to ‘systemically significant economies’ and 
the absence of  a reference to the G20 as a ‘representative’ forum. The question of  legitimacy,  in terms of  
‘representing’ a large share of  the global economy, was not really an issue in 1999. It was simply a club of  
‘systemically significant economies’.  
The countries invited for the first G20 meeting in Berlin in December 1999 were Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of  Korea, Mexico, the 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, and the USA. In addition to these 19 
nation states, a representative from the EU was invited to be a formal member as well, taking the total 
number of  members to 20. Nation states and the EU were not the only invitees, however. The managing 
director of  the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the president of  the World Bank and the chairs of  the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Development Committee also 
participated in the first G-20 meetings. 
The creation of  the G20 forum in 1999 reflected, of  course, a recognition that the weight of  the G7 
countries in the global economy was declining due to the rapid growth of  dynamic emerging market 
economies, but also the objective of  including all ‘significant’ economic powers in deliberations on matters 
of  global economic governance. But the process by which countries were selected for these purposes was 
of  questionable legitimacy, a ‘reflex of  the G7 world’ (Wade 2009:553): 
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They were selected by Timothy Geithner at the US Treasury in a transatlantic telephone call with his 
counterpart at the German Finance Ministry, Caio Koch-Weser. Geithner and Koch-Weser went down the 
list of countries saying, Canada in, Spain out, South Africa in, Nigeria and Egypt out, and so on; they sent 
their list to the other G7 finance ministries; and the invitations to the first meeting went out (ibid.) 
The inclusion of  countries such as Argentina, Australia and Saudi Arabia reflected not so much that these 
were considered more ‘systemically significant’ than other countries, but that an effort was made to include 
in the forum good allies of  the US. In the case of  Argentina, its inclusion was allegedly intimately related 
to good personal relations between Secretary of  the US Treasury, Larry Summers, and Argentine finance 
minister, Domingo Cavallo, who had shared accommodations as Harvard graduate students (Patrick 2010: 
49).  
For the first many years the G20 forum of  finance ministers and central bank governors attracted little 
public attention. But with the advent of  the global financial crisis this changed completely. Now leaders of  
the great powers of  the world economy decided to use the G20 construction as the basis for creating a 
Heads of  State forum in which to discuss and coordinate responses to the global financial crisis. In a short 
period of  time, the G20 moved from relative obscurity to centre stage in media coverage of  global 
economic governance in the face of  a financial crisis that threatened to cause a meltdown of  the global 
economy.  
There was no script, of  course, laying out in advance that the G20 forum should be chosen for this role. 
The most relevant alternatives at the time were the G13 forum – the G8 plus the ‘outreach five’ (Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico and South Africa) – or the governing body of  the IMF. There were serious 
shortcomings in both these alternatives, however.  
The IMF was not in good standing in Asia after its role in exacerbating the financial crisis there a decade 
earlier, by imposing contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in return for IMF funding packages. 
Furthermore, reforms of  the voting power of  member countries in the governing bodies of  the IMF (and 
the World Bank) had not really progressed despite principal agreements on the necessity of  such reforms 
and years of  deliberations. With their limited formal voting power, and the long tradition of  US-European 
dominance of  the IMF, it was not surprising that the dynamic emerging market economies preferred the 
G20 as the premier forum for deliberation on these issues.  
The G13 countries met annually at the margins of  G8 summits from 2005 in Gleneagles to 2007 in 
Heiligendam, but the ‘outreach five’ were never entirely impressed and convinced by a format in which 
they were marginal invitees rather than equal cooperation partners. Compared to a G13 initiative, the G20 
had two further advantages. First, deliberations among the member countries of  the G20 had been 
thoroughly institutionalized in and through a decade of  informal meetings of  the finance ministers and 
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central bank governors. Second, its claim to ‘represent’ the world was – not just in real terms, but also 
symbolically – somewhat greater.   
The G20 had the further advantage over these two alternatives that the idea of  elevating it to the Heads of  
State-level had circulated for a couple of  years already. Paul Martin, Canadian Finance Minister and Prime 
Minister from the mid-90s to 2006, is widely recognised for being the first to promote this vigorously. In 
2004, he said: 
An approach I believe to be worthwhile would be to look at the lessons learned from the Group of 20 
Finance Ministers… We foresaw an informal gathering of Finance Ministers, representing established and 
emerging centres of influence, and coming from very different political, economic, cultural and religious 
traditions… [I]t has worked remarkably well – because peer pressure is often a very effective way to force 
decisions. We believe a similar approach among leaders could help crack some of the toughest issues facing 
the world (Martin 2004).1  
Despite these laudable intentions, two things must be stressed. First, that when disagreements amongst the 
major economic power loomed larger, the informal G20 forum did not work ‘remarkably well’. Second, as 
a Leader’s forum for responding to the global financial crisis and for devising principles of  global economic 
governance in 2008 – the G20 was from the very beginning outdated in terms of  its composition. Had 
twenty countries been selected in 2008, on the basis of  the then prevailing geopolitical world order, there is 
no doubt that a different set of  countries would have been arrived at. This is recognised even by G20 
proponents: “The G20 reflects the membership of  the finance ministers’ network created in 1999, and 
does not take into account changes since that time (Patrick 2010: 20). By extension, it must be stressed that 
the G20 does not consist of  the twenty largest economies of  the world, as popular conception has it, and 
that the selection of  countries included was not based on objective criteria. This, in itself, is problematic. 
But most importantly it pinpoints a major shortcoming of  the G20 as the ‘premier forum’ of  global 
economic governance: how is membership to be adjusted to the rapidly changing realities of  the global 
economy in the coming years? In this sense, the main strength of  the G20 – that it was already there, 
ready-made and ‘flexible’ – was at the same time its main weakness: in terms of  its membership it was 
outdated from its inception, and this problem will only increase in the coming years. In the words of  
Steward Patrick:  
Perhaps the trickiest issue surrounding the G20’s membership is whether the body should be prepared to 
adjust its participants in response to inevitable shifts in the global distribution of economic power…. In the 
absence of objective criteria, however, … a regular process of readjustment seems unlikely (Patrick 2010: 
22-23). 
                                               
1 Cited from Cooper and English (2005: 7). 
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THE G20: INEFFECTIVE AND ILLEGITIMATE? 
The G20’s contested claim to legitimacy 
It is essential for the G20 to be able to appeal to notions of  legitimacy. A self-proclaimed ‘steering 
committee’ for the global economy must in some sense ‘represent’ the global economy. In the G20’s 
phrasing, this legitimacy comes from its ‘economic weight’ and ‘broad membership’: 
Together, member countries represent around 90 per cent of global gross national product, 80 per cent of 
world trade (including EU intra-trade) as well as two-thirds of the world's population. The G-20's 
economic weight and broad membership gives it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the 
management of the global economy and financial system (G20 2010a). 
With regard to the G20’s membership, it is important to stress that the G20 consists not of  twenty but of  
nineteen member countries. The twentieth member of  the G20 is the EU, “represented by the rotating 
Council presidency and the European Central Bank” (G20 2010a). The G20 is really a G19, then, or a 
‘G19+1’, if  you like. In addition to the twenty formal members of  the G20, a number of  international 
organizations have participated as ‘special guests’, ‘outreach participants’, or ‘observers’ (the nomenclature 
varies). The IMF and the World Bank, for instance, have participated in G20 summits with their respective 
Presidents as well as with the chairmen of  their governing bodies.2 Other international organizations that 
have participated in G20 summits include the United Nations, OECD, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Financial Stability Board. 
With respect to the formal membership of  the G20, the mix of  nineteen member countries and one 
regional body, the EU, is in many ways an awkward construction. It means that some European countries 
have ‘double representation’ in the G20, as they are represented both by their own Heads of  State and by 
the representatives of  the EU, while a vast range of  European countries that are not members of  the EU 
are not represented at all.3 A further disadvantage of  this ‘system’ is that it raises the legitimate question of  
why the EU has been included but not other regional organizations, such as ASEAN or the African Union, 
for instance. The inclusion of  representatives of  the EU in an informal G20 finance ministers’ forum in 
1999 was much less controversial than its privileged participation in a G20 Leader’s forum, seeking to play 
a self-proclaimed role of  ‘steering committee’ for the global economy.  
It must be noted in this regard that the EU is not the only regional body that has participated in later G20 
summits. In Toronto and Seoul, representatives from ASEAN and the African Union, for instance, 
                                               
2 “To ensure global economic fora and institutions work together, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the President of the World Bank, plus the chairs of the International Monetary and Financial Committee and 
Development Committee of the IMF and World Bank, also participate in G20 meetings on an ex-offio basis” (G20 2101a). 
3 The more inclusive of Europe’s regional organizations, the Council of Europe, thus has 47 members as compared to the 27 
members of the EU. The Council of Europe was founded after the Second World War and Montenegro was the latest country to 
join in 2007. 
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participated and this arrangement seems to have now been institutionalized. Given that the G20 is an 
informal, consensus-driven body, is there a risk of  exaggerating the difference of  being a formal member, 
such as the EU, or a regional representative of  the ASEAN countries, one might ask. In this regard it must 
be stressed that formal members participate in G20 summits with three persons – a Head of  State, a 
Finance Minister and a Senior Civil Servant (the country’s so-called G20 sherpa) – while outreach 
participants such as countries representing a regional body (Vietnam for ASEAN) or international 
organizations (the IMF, for instance) are represented by only one person. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
outreach participants are involved as anything like equal partners in the deliberations and negotiations that 
take place at the level of  finance ministers and central bank governors, and their respective civil servants, in 
preparing the G20 summits. 
Hence, while it generally makes sense to engage regional and international organizations in G20 
deliberations, as has been increasingly the practice, convincing criteria and formats for such participation 
must be developed rather than left to the discretion of  the summit host. It is particularly important that 
one treats all regional bodies on equal terms, instead of  granting one of  them privileged status. Including 
the EU in the formal membership of  the G20 may serve to artificially inflate the figures on the G20’s 
weight in the global economy, but this ‘benefit’ comes at a rather high cost. It is difficult to see how this 
special status of  the EU, at the symbolic level as well as in terms of  presence at the high table at G20 
summits, can be seen as anything other than preferential treatment of  the EU over other regional bodies – 
and, by extension, of  Europe over other regions. In brief, it would be wise to let the EU participate not as 
a formal member of  the G20, but on equal terms with other regional bodies and international 
organizations, as observers, in the future. This in and of  itself  would greatly enhance the G20’s legitimacy, 
not least in the eyes of  many non-EU observers.  
The shares of  world GDP, trade and population that the G20 claim title to are based on calculus that 
includes all EU countries. Differences of  opinion exist with respect to whether the GDP and population 
of  all EU countries should be included in the calculus of  G20 shares of  the global economy or not. 
Certainly, there is a strong element of  mixing categories here. The population of  nineteen countries are 
represented directly through their own national representatives, while the population of  27 EU countries 
are ‘represented’ indirectly through the EU seat. It should be noted in this context that the nineteen 
member countries of  the G20 together account for 77 pct of  world GDP (not 90 pct), 60 pct of  world 
trade (not 80 pct) and 62 pct of  world population (not two-thirds).4 
                                               
4 2009-figures, World Development Indicators. 
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‘Surely, the G20 is better than the G7?’ 
Another key line of  defence for the G20 against protests that it is an illegitimate body is that it cannot 
sensibly be criticized because it is so obviously an improvement vis-à-vis the G7. How can it be considered 
anything but progress when the large economic powers of  the past couple of  decades start consulting with 
the dynamic emerging market economies, in recognition of  the rapidly changing economic world order, as 
opposed to consulting only amongst themselves?  
It is of  course a positive development that the G7 countries now feel inclined, perhaps even obliged, to 
consult in a systematic manner with the dynamic emerging market economies about the future growth and 
stability of  the global economy. Indeed, some form of  multipolar deliberation and dialogue was and is 
inevitable in responding to the economic crisis and in striving to devise new principles of  global economic 
governance was inevitable, given the geopolitical realities of  the world economy. There are several reasons, 
however, why the G20 was the wrong form of  multipolar deliberation. First, the G20 continues and 
reinforces a troubling trend towards ‘plurilateralism-of-the-big’, by which the vast majority of  nations lose 
voice and influence on matters that affect them crucially. Second, the G20 effectively undermines the 
existing system of  multilateral cooperation in institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United 
Nations, causing resentment towards the G20 in those institutions in general and among non-G20 
countries in particular (Bosco 2010).5 Thirdly, what is needed to address the key problems today – such as 
global imbalances, the climate crisis, and rising poverty, unemployment and inequality – is not an informal 
Leaders’ forum, but formal and binding deliberations and agreements in a truly multilateral framework (see 
more on this below). 
The ineffectiveness of  the G20 
In the run-up to the Seoul summit, the G20 was depicted by key commentators as “divided, ineffective and 
illegitimate” (Rachman 2010). The impression of  an ineffective forum of  leaders was reinforced during 
and after the Seoul summit. In Seoul, G20 leaders failed to make progress in dealing with the matter of  
global imbalances (Giles et al 2010; FT 2010). There are other examples of  the ineffectiveness of  the G20 
(Vestergaard 2011b); suffice it here to mention one particularly unfortunate one.  
In the wake of  the failure of  the Seoul summit with respect to global imbalances, proponents of  the G20 
have pointed to two areas of  success: IMF reform and the new agreement on international banking 
regulation, the so-called Basel 3 agreement. With regard to the latter, Domenico Lombardi praises the role 
of  the G20:  
                                               
5 For more on this, see Vestergaard (2011b). 
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Failure to reach an (admittedly difficult) agreement on a piloted across-the-board adjustment of balance-of-
payments should not overshadow the rapid agreement achieved with regard to the Basil III Accord, which 
would not have been possible without the political momentum provided by the G-20 leaders (Lombardi 
2010). 
While it may be true that the Basel 3 agreement would not have been reached in the course of  less than a 
year without the political momentum provided by the G20 summit process, there are important 
qualifications to be made. First, as the result of  intense banking industry lobbying the Basel 3 agreement 
stipulates that its regulations can be phased in between 2015 and 2019, with the substantial associated risk 
that by that time public attention to international banking regulation will have withered away, hence 
allowing international banks, once again, to ignore the new modes of  regulation and proceed with business 
as usual (Persaud 2010). Second, the actual Basel 3 agreement itself  is a huge disappointment, if  not a 
downright failure. Finance professors usually stay out of  political affairs. Thus, all the more remarkable was 
the letter publicized in the Financial Times by twenty of  the world’s leading finance professors in the run-up 
to the Seoul summit, commenting on the Basel 3 agreement.6 The agreement drafted for approval by the 
G20 Leaders in Seoul failed to “eliminate key structural flaws in the system” and hence urged the finance 
professors to remind the G20 Leaders that when devising new modes of  international banking regulation 
“healthy banking is the goal, not profitable banks” (Admati et al 2010) 
Proponents of  the G20 may object that the G20 cannot be held responsible for the failings of  the Basel 
committee. But keep in mind that the members of  the Basel committee are, by and large, the finance 
ministers and central bank governors of  the G20 countries.7 If  the G20 cannot incline a committee of  its 
own finance ministers and central bank governors to deliver a significant result on what is the single most 
important reform agenda – international banking regulation – does it then make sense at all to think of  the 
G20 as a ‘steering committee’ for the global economy? I argue that it does not. The uncomfortable truth is 
that the G20 has failed to have any substantial political impact on any of  the key problems haunting the 
global economy. It has indeed shown itself  to be little more than the ‘toothless talk shop’ many feared it 
would be when the rubber hit the road (Wolverson 2010). 
The assumption underlying the initial faith in the G20 seems to have been that the world needed a new 
leaders’ forum which included the dynamic emerging market economies as full and equal members, while  
preserving the “agility and informality that leaders find so attractive” (Patrick 2010: 22). But the problems 
that the worlds’ leaders need to address require binding agreements not informal dialogue. Indeed, an 
                                               
6 The prominent list of finance professors signing the letter included Professor Anat R. Admati (Stanford), Professor Markus K. 
Brunnermeier (Princeton), Eugene F. Fama (Chicago) and Professor Charles Goodhart (London School of Economics). 
7 The member countries of the Basel committee are the nineteen member countries of the G20 plus a handful of additional 
European countries (Belgium,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland) and two countries that are financial 
hubs in Asia (Hong Kong and Singapore). 
 14 
informal mode of  cooperation system is unlikely to be effective when the parties are as fundamentally 
divided as is the case of  the largest powers in today’s global economy:  
Even if the G20 restricts its conversation to economic matters, its ideological diversity makes it harder to 
find common ground… [U]nlike the historical existence of the G7 nations, which have long been political 
and military allies, there is no background security ‘glue’ binding G20  members that might facilitate 
multilateral cooperation when specific interests collide (Patrick 2010: 30-31). 
Despite this fundamental difference between the G20 and the G7, the implicit assumption seems to have 
been that an informal G20 would be as effective as the G7 had been previously. But precisely because of  
the fundamental differences of  opinion in and among the worlds’ major economic powers, an informal 
forum is no longer the proper institutional format. It is noteworthy in this regard that disagreement and 
tension is by no means exclusively or even mainly between the US and China. On the contrary, the conflict 
lines are many and they criss-cross traditional divides of  Part 1 vs Part 2 countries and market capitalism vs 
state-capitalism. Indeed, Gidon Rachman recently identified as many as seven major pillars of  friction in 
the G20 deliberations (Rachman 2010). Given the substantial differences among the world’s major powers, 
a more binding form of  dialogue and deliberation is likely to be more conducive to progress on the 
substantive matters.  
Inclusion and exclusion 
A major problem of  the G20 in its current configuration is that there are several ways in which it is not 
‘representative’ of  the global economy. First, the only African country in the G20 is South Africa, whereas 
there are six countries from each of  the other three main regions of  the world (see table 1 below). Second, 
not one single low-income country is included in the G20, whereas both middle-income and high-income 
countries are well represented, by nine and ten countries respectively. This reflects, of  course, that when 
the countries were originally selected the intention was to create a forum for ‘systemically significant’ 
economies, a category to which no low-income country belongs. Today, however, after having been 
elevated to a heads of  state forum which intends to be the premier forum of  global economic governance, 
the absence of  any low-income country is deeply problematic. The same applies for the absence of  small, 
open economies: this type of  economy is perhaps the most common in the world economy, but there is 
nevertheless no small economy included in the G20 to voice the perspectives and concerns of  such 
economies.  
If  one divides the world in four main regions – Americas and Australasia, Europe, Asia, and Africa – the 
under-representation of  Africa comes across quite clearly. The representation of  the three other regions, 
on the other hand, is well-balanced: six countries from each.   
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Table 1  G20 countries – by region and income classification  
 Low-income countries Middle-income countries  High-income countries Total 
Africa 0 South Africa  1 
Americas & 
Australasia 
0 Argentina, Brazil, Mexico Australia, Canada, USA 6 
Asia 0 China, India, Indonesia Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia 6 
Europe  0 Russia, Turkey France, Germany, Italy, UK 6 
Total 0 9 10 19 
 
The under-representation of  Africa has given rise to considerable criticism not least, of  course, from the 
excluded African countries. The African Union (AU) repeatedly complained over its exclusion, appealing to 
G20 leaders that they considered Africa’s right to be an active player in the process and “not to suffer, as 
always, the consequences of  other people’s mistakes” (cited in Mururi, 2008).8 From the perspective of  
African countries, the G20 was seen not as a major innovation, reflecting a new world economic order as 
of  2008, but as an extension of  “the old architecture”, in the words of  Ugandan Central Bank Governor, 
Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile (cited in NN 2010). As in the case of  the objections of  ASEAN, this 
criticism has been dealt with in later summits by means of  ad hoc invitations on the part of  the summit 
hosts. Thus, Ethiopia and Malawi were invited for both the Toronto and the Seoul summits.9 
Not simply the ‘20 largest economies’ 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the G20 does not consist of  the world’s 20 largest countries, in terms of  
population and/or GDP.  Table 2 gives an overview of  the world’s twenty largest countries by four 
different measures: GDP at market values, GDP at purchasing power parity, GDP as an average of  market 
values and purchasing power parity; and by population.  
                                               
8 The African Union (AU), established in 2002, represents all African countries except Morocco (a total of 53 countries). The AU is 
successor to the previous Organization of African Unity (OAU).  
9 Malawi currently holds the chairmanship of the AU, whereas Ethiopia is home to the AU’s secretariat. 
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Table 2  The world’s largest countries, by GDP (billion USD) and population (millions) 10 
Ranking GDP (nominal) GDP (PPP) GDP * (60/40) By population 
1 US (14256) US (14256) US (14256) China (1331) 
2 Japan (5068) China (9104) China (6633) India (1155) 
3 China (4985) Japan (4138) Japan (4696) US (307) 
4 Germany (3347) India (3784) Germany (3202) Indonesia (230) 
5 France (2649) Germany (2984) France (2458) Brazil (194) 
6 UK (2175) Russia (2687) India (2300) Pakistan (170) 
7 Italy (2113) UK (2257) UK (2207) Bangladesh (162) 
8 Brazil (1572) France (2172) Italy (2036) Nigeria (155) 
9 Spain (1460) Brazil (2020) Russia (1813) Russia (142) 
10 Canada (1336) Italy (1922) Brazil (1751) Japan (128) 
11 India (1310) Mexico (1540) Spain (1474) Mexico (107) 
12 Russia (1231) Spain (1496) Canada (1314) Philippines (92) 
13 Australia (925) Korea, Rep. (1324) Mexico (1141) Vietnam (87) 
14 Mexico (875) Canada (1280) Korea, Rep. (1029) Egypt (83) 
15 Korea, Rep. (833) Turkey (1040) Australia (898) Ethiopia (83) 
16 Netherlands (792) Indonesia (967) Turkey (786) Germany (82) 
17 Turkey (617) Australia (858) Netherlands (745) Turkey (75) 
18 Indonesia (540) Iran (844) Indonesia (711) Iran (73) 
19 Belgium (469) Poland (727) Poland (549) Thailand (68) 
20 Poland (430) Netherlands (673) Iran (536) Congo, DRC (66) 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI). All data are for 2009 (latest available). 
The set of  countries that are the world’s twenty largest vary considerably with the indicator chosen. A key 
problem of  the existing G20 membership is that it is not based on objective criteria. It seems impossible 
even to ‘reverse-engineer’ a set of  criteria that would lead to the selection of  the current G20 member 
countries.   
Table 2 above amply demonstrates that a different set of  G20 member countries – which would be more 
representative in terms of  indicators such as GDP and population – could easily be construed. It is 
important to stress this because it means that the G20, in its current configuration, cannot claim to be 
legitimate, not even in the limited sense of  being the world’s largest economies. If  one was to reshape the 
                                               
10 There is no agreement among governments about which GDP indicator to use. Generally, most developed countries are 
proponents of using GDP at market values (nominal) while many emerging market economies prefer GDP at purchasing power 
parity (PPP). In the recent voting power realignment in the World Bank, the compromise reached was to use a composite GDP 
indicator, given 60 pct weight to GDP at market values and 40 pct weight to GDP at purchasing power parity. This composite 
GDP indicator is referred to throughout this paper as GDP*. 
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G20 so as to actually be comprised of  the worlds’ twenty largest economies, significant changes would 
need to be made. Table 3 schematically illustrates these changes – in terms of  which countries would be 
excluded and which would be included, if  the G20 consisted of  the world’s 20 largest countries, by four 
different indicators. 
Table 3  If  the G20 consisted of  the 20 largest economies 11 
 Countries OUT Countries IN 
By GDP (nominal) Argentina, South Africa, Saudi Arabia Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Spain 
By GDP (PPP) Argentina, South Africa, Saudi Arabia Iran, Netherlands, Poland, Spain 
By GDP * Argentina, South Africa, Saudi Arábia Iran, Netherlands, Poland, Spain 
By population Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, 
Saudi Arábia, South África, South Korea, 
UK. 
Bangladesh, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Phillipines, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
 
Three countries would be excluded from the G20 membership irrespective of  which of  these four 
indicators were used as criterion: Argentina, South Africa and South Korea. The countries that would be 
included vary depending on the indicator, but in the case of  all three GDP indicators Netherlands, Poland 
and Spain would be new member countries. This is a slightly surprising result. In debates on the 
membership of  the G20, Europe is seen by many, especially in the US, as grossly over-represented. This is 
so even to the extent that “European overrepresentation has become a source of  global resentment” 
(Patrick 2010: 20). But when reviewed in terms of  GDP data on the world’s largest economies, this idea of  
European overrepresentation proves to be false. Regardless of  what GDP-measure is used, Europe is 
under-represented by at least three countries. By all three GDP measures, a reshaping of  the G20 to reflect 
weight in the global economy would result in three new permanent G20 member countries from Europe: 
Netherlands, Poland and Spain. 
If  measured instead by population, however, Europe would indeed be over-represented. If  the G20 was 
revised to consist of  the twenty largest countries as measured by population Europe would be represented 
only by Germany, Turkey and Russia, with France, Italy and the UK losing their seats. But Europe would 
not be the only region to loose seats if  population was the criteria used. In fact, a total of  nine countries 
would have to give up their seat, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
South Korea.  
It should be noted in this connection that if  G20 membership was revised so as to be determined by 
                                               
11 In each category, one more country is included than is excluded. This reflects the contention that the G20 should consist of 
twenty member countries instead of nineteen countries plus the EU, as is currently the case. 
 18 
weight in the global economy (GDP by some measure), it would have two positive effects and one 
negative. On the positive side, the selection of  countries on the basis of  objective criteria would add to its 
legitimacy and the aggregate share of  world GDP would obviously increase. On the negative side, however, 
it would be hugely detrimental to the legitimacy of  the G20 in the sense that there would no longer be any 
African country included, since South Africa is not part of  the top-20 in any of  the three measures of  
GDP. This would add insult to injury, as African countries already do not feel represented by South Africa.  
The fundamental illegitimacy of  the G20  
The G20 is a group of  countries that constitutes a large part of  the world economy and world population, 
but this is not enough to give it legitimacy as a steering committee for the world economy. A reasonable 
claim to legitimacy cannot be made for a body of  global economic governance when 172 countries are 
permanently excluded and hence have no voice or influence on deliberations that shape and frame their 
future. Consider an analogy with systems of  national representation: would an arrangement by which 
everyone over 18 years in the US had voting rights – except all Jews and Muslims – be legitimate on the 
grounds that these two groups are so small minorities that they don’t really count in the larger picture 
anyway? Of  course not. What this analogy helps accentuate is that legitimacy in representational terms 
ultimately is a matter of  ensuring that minorities have voice and influence on equal terms with the rest of  
the constituency. Any talk of  legitimacy in the case of  the G20 is non-sense. It is a self-selected and 
illegitimate group of  countries which – by permanently excluding 172 countries from key deliberations on 
global economic governance – is undermining a system of  multilateral cooperation that it has taken more 
than sixty years to build. 
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ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE G20? 
By far the most common response to quarrels about the legitimacy deficiencies of  the G20 is to propose 
some form of  revision of  its membership. The following considers two such revisionist approaches to 
enhancing the legitimacy of  the G20. These two proposals shed an interesting light on the existing G20 
configuration as well as on the efforts made by the G20 to address various criticisms of  its illegitimacy.  
Objective criteria and broader membership 
One strategy for addressing the membership and legitimacy problems of  the current G20 would be to 
rethink its membership in a manner that makes it more ‘representative’ according to a set of  objective 
criteria, as opposed to on the basis of  just one indicator or on the basis of  no explicit criteria (as is 
currently the case). Obvious candidates for such a set of  criteria would be the following: 
 weight in the world economy, measured by GDP  
 proportion of  the world’s population 
 regional inclusion, ensuring that all regions are well-represented 
 inclusion of  all types of  countries, by income classification 
It would be relatively simple to modify the G20 along these lines in a manner that would not only enhance 
it regional coverage but also included a couple of  low-income countries in its membership, while at the 
same time maintaining its current levels of  share of  world GDP and share of  world population. Consider 
the following operationalization of  these principles of  membership:  
 All of  the top 16 countries in terms of  GDP, measured in purchasing power terms 
 Four additional countries chosen to ensure that all regions are well-represented, more specifically 
that the G20 membership consists of  at least three countries from each of  the world’s four regions 
 These additional four countries are chosen within each region on the basis of  GDP weight, 
population size, and geographical-cultural variation. 
The top 16 countries in terms of  GDP (at PPP values) are given in Table 1 above. The second criteria 
would require three African countries to be included. In terms of  the combined criteria of  population size, 
GDP weight and intra-regional variation, the most pertinent choice of  African countries would be Egypt, 
Nigeria, and South Africa. Several options exist for the choice of  the last country of  the revised G20 
membership. One option would be to accommodate protests from the Nordic countries, by including 
Sweden, hence adding a country from the otherwise excluded Scandinavian region. The Nordics find their 
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exclusion from the G20 membership unfortunate for two reasons. First, because they represent more than 
2,31 pct of  the world’s GDP (1347 billion USD) and hence have more economic weight than G20 
members such as Canada, India, Russia, Australia, Korea and Indonesia (see table 2).12 Second, because 
they feel that they represent multilateral values and commitments that merit their participation in the key 
bodies of  global economic governance.13  
As compared to the current configuration of  the G20, the application of  these new principles for G20 
membership would entail replacing Argentina, Australia, and Saudi Arabia with Egypt, Nigeria, Sweden and 
Spain (since South Africa is included in the original set of  G20 countries, which Spain is not, despite its 
high GDP ranking). In terms of  share of  GDP and share of  population, this reconfigured G20*  would 
compare to the existing G20 – which has 19 member countries – as follows: 
Table 4  G20 versus G20* (share of  world GDP and world population, in pct) 
 GDP (nominal) GDP (PPP) Population 
G19 76.9 74.5 61.3 
G19+Spain 79.4 76.5 62.0 
G20 * 78.0 75.3 64.4 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 2009-data. 
The revised set of  countries would comprise a higher share of  both world GDP and world population 
than the existing set of  nineteen formal member countries. Compared to the existing nineteen member 
countries plus Spain, the self-declared ‘permanent guest’ of  the G20, the revised G20* would have a 
slightly smaller share of  world GDP but still a higher share of  world population.  
The important point to stress here is that not only is a principle-based selection of  G20 member countries 
possible; the selection of  a new set of  countries – which includes three African countries instead of  one – 
may increase rather than decrease the aggregate share of  world GDP and world population of  G20 member 
countries. 
A partial constituency model  
Rueda-Sabater and colleagues at the Centre for Global Development in Washington argues that for a global 
governance arrangement to have “lasting credibility”, it must be based on “transparent criteria” (Rueda-
                                               
12 The total World GDP (at market rates) was 58,228 billion USD in 2009, according to World Development Indicators, giving the 
Nordic countries are share of world GDP of 2.31 pct. The ranking of the Nordic economies varies, of course, with what measure 
of GDP is chosen. While the Nordic countries are the tenth largest economy if measured in GDP at market rates, they drop to 
sixteenth place (ahead of Indonesia, just after Turkey) if measured by GDP at purchasing power parity (1022 billion USD).   
13 Indeed, it is not without irony that the Nordic-Baltic constituency is the only country constituency of the Bretton Woods 
institutions that is not ‘represented’ by a country in the G20 membership or have managed to negotiate some form of ad hoc 
participation in the later G20 summits. 
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Sabater et al 2009: 2). On these grounds they reject both a ‘club’ approach, such as the OECD, and a 
‘hosted’ approach, “such as the G7 expanding ‘by invitation’ to a G20” (ibid.). Instead they propose what 
could be called a ‘partial constituency’-model, by which membership is comprised of  two types of  
countries: (i) countries that are among the world’s biggest in terms of  GDP and/or population, and (ii) 
countries that are elected as representatives of  each of  the world’s main regions.  
In the former category, the suggestion is to select the 16 countries that have a share of  world GDP or 
world population higher than 2 pct. Currently, this would yield the following set of  countries: Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, 
United Kingdom and United States.  As compared with the existing G20 membership, the 2 per cent rule 
would exclude Argentina, Australia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.  
Countries elected as representatives of  each of  the world’s main regions are included in recognition that 
for “a global governance system to be truly representative, it must also deal in some form with universality” 
(Rueda-Sabater et al 2009: 10). “But instead of  allowing that notion to cripple the effectiveness of  the 
governance system”, the authors continue, “an alternative approach might be something akin to the 
‘protection of  minority rights’” (ibid.). More specifically, the proposed solution is for five countries to be 
elected, one in each of  the following five regional groupings: Americas, Europe+, Middle East/South Asia, 
Africa, East Asia/Pacific. This brings the total number of  countries included in this new system of  global 
governance to twenty-one.  
The claim to ‘universality’ made in the proposal by Rueda-Sabater and colleagues is little more than 
cosmetic, however. Voice, influence and representation for minorities should not be a concession at the 
margins. Choosing sixteen big countries and then adding five to represent the rest of  the world’s 176 
countries would amount to little more than a pretension to universality. Representation in the Bretton 
Woods institutions, on the other hand, is based on genuine universality in the sense that all member 
countries are represented in their governing bodies with voting power in proportion to their GDP.14  
A brief  comparison with the governing bodies of  the Bretton Woods institutions may further highlight the 
limitations of  the proposal of  Rueda-Sabater and colleagues. There are five countries that have traditionally 
appointed their own chair for the governing bodies of  in the World Bank and the IMF, while the remaining 
nineteen chairs represent each their country constituency. Until recently these five countries were the US, 
Japan, Germany, UK and France, but in the course of  the ongoing voice reforms of  the Bretton Woods 
institutions China is now being given the right to appoint its own chair, to reflect the fact that it is 
surpassing Japan to become the second largest economy of  the world. In a sense, one may depict the 
                                               
14 Membership of the Bretton Woods institutions is near-complete: the IMF and the World Bank both have 187 member countries, 
as compared to the 192 member countries of the United Nations.  
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Bretton Woods institutions as based on a partial constituency model itself: five countries represent only 
themselves, and the remaining 182 member countries are represented in the form of  nineteen country 
constituencies. In the proposal of  Ramachandran and colleagues, the balance between single country-chairs 
and country constituencies is turned upside-down: nineteen countries represent only themselves and the 
remaining countries are represented through as little as five chairs. There is reason to doubt whether these 
five chairs, which would represent on average thirty-five countries each, would makes much sense as a 
vehicle for multilateral corporation. Indeed, a central concern through out the recent voice reform process 
in the World Bank was the need to reduce the number of  countries in the largest country-constituencies to a 
maximum of  16 countries, so as to make the complexity of  intra-constituency dialogue and deliberation 
manageable (Vestergaard 2011a).  
Efforts by the G20 to accommodate its critics 
In responding to various criticisms of  its illegitimacy the G20 has not yet considered a revision of  its core 
membership, as both of  the discussed revisionist approaches would have called for. Instead, the response 
has been limited to ad hoc invitations of  a few countries as representatives of  regional organizations such 
as the African Union and ASEAN. This may be seen as a de facto recognition of  the illegitimacy of  having 
one regional body (EU) participating at the high table, while other regions do not have such representation. 
The G20 has addressed the criticism, in other words, that some regions are underrepresented relative to 
others by means of  sending ad hoc summit invitations to countries considered representatives of  
‘underrepresented’ regions. Thus, ASEAN has now been represented as outreach participant in five 
summits, and Ethiopia and Malawi have participated in the two latest summits as representatives of  the 
African Union.15  
At the Seoul summit this previously ‘spontaneous’ practice of  ad hoc invitations, at the discretion of  the 
summit host, was institutionalised in and trough the summit communiqué: “We reached broad agreement”, 
the declaration said, “on a set of  principles for non-member invitations to Summits, including that we will 
invite no more than five non-member invitees, of  which at least two will be from Africa” (G20 2010b). 
This reflects the pattern of  the two latest summits. Both in Toronto and Seoul, five countries were invited 
to participate as ‘special guests’. In Toronto, the five special guests were Spain, Netherlands, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, and Vietnam, whereas in Seoul, Singapore was invited instead of  the Netherlands, while the other 
four were the same.  
In response to criticism, the G20 has in effect become a ‘G20+5’, in other words. Of  the 25 participating 
                                               
15 ASEAN is the Association of South East Asian Nations, which has eight member countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 2011, Indonesia will take over the chairmanship of 
ASEAN.   
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members and special guests, twenty represent only themselves, and five represents a region, or group of  
countries. The twenty members that represent only themselves are the original nineteen member countries 
plus Spain, the self-declared ‘permanent guest’. The five participants that represented a region or group of  
countries in Seoul were the following: 
 Ethiopia and Malawi: representatives of  the African Union  
 Vietnam: representative of  ASEAN 
 EU presidency and Head of  ECB (shared seat): representative of  the European Union 
 Singapore: representative of  the Global Governance Group (3G), consisting of  28 member 
countries from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South America, Latin America and the 
Carribean. 
Four of  these regional seats seem more or less fixed by now, namely the two seats to represent the African 
Union, the representative of  ASEAN and the EU seat. Only the last of  the five ‘special guests’ will be left 
to the discretion of  the summit host to decide (Hermawan 2010: 40). 
Needless to say, this ‘G20+5’ construction gives more countries voice in the G20 process. All African 
countries (except Morocco, which is not a member of  the African Union) thus now have voice and 
influence through the representatives of  the African Union. Three important observations must be made, 
however. First, the ‘G20+5’ suffers from the rather severe problem that the balance of  single country 
representatives vs. country constituencies is dramatically worse than that of  the existing Bretton Woods 
institutions: nineteen countries represent only themselves and the attempt to reach as many of  the 
remaining 173 countries as possible through the invitation of  five ‘special observers’ has little but cosmetic 
significance from the perspective of  multilateralism. Second, as mentioned previously, formal members and 
‘special observers’ by far participate on equal terms in the summits, and the latter are largely excluded from 
the deliberations and negotiations that are undertaken to prepare the G20 Leaders’ summits. Hence, in 
effect the role of  ‘special observer’ is symbolic rather than substantial. Third, the now institutionalized 
practice of  inviting five special observers for each summit is based on no objective criteria – and hence the 
already existing problem of  arbitrary mechanisms of  inclusion and exclusion is being further reinforced.16  
                                               
16 This goes also for the problem of ‘double representation’ of some countries through the inclusion of the EU: with the permanent 
inclusion of an ASEAN representative there is now also double representation of Indonesia, which is a G20 member country and 
a member of ASEAN, as well as of Singapore which participates as a member of the Global Governance Group (3G), while 
being at the same time a member of ASEAN. 
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BEYOND THE G20  
Diplomacy is crucial… 
When international media was full of  fear of  an impending currency war, G20 finance ministers held a 
pre-summit meeting in Gyeongju and managed to at least temporarily dampen tensions around these 
issues, by agreeing on the principle that all countries should strive to limit their current account deficits and 
surpluses on their balance of  payments. This led some observes to argue that one of  the most important 
advantages of  the G20 process is an informal one. Just as G7 meetings led to ‘close and repeated personal 
contacts between key economic policy makers and civil servants’, now similar close networks of  familiarity 
and trust are being build among the G20 menber countries: 
[T]he G20 process is likely to lead to much greater personal familiarity and a more common understanding 
of the key policy challenges for policy makers and their staff, which in turn can greatly contribute to 
tackling problems and co-operation. Indeed, it was the shuttle diplomacy of some senior civil servants that 
made the Gyeongu agreement possible and diffused tensions (Dervis 2010).  
The importance of  such shuttle diplomacy, or ‘concert’ among the world’s leaders – to use David Bosco’s 
phrasing (Bosco 2009) – should not be underestimated, particularly not in situations of  deep disagreement 
and tension among the world’s largest economies. The subsequent failure of  the G20 summit in Seoul to 
reach any agreement on the matter of  global imbalances illustrates, however, the limitations of  such 
diplomacy when undertaken in the context of  an informal forum such as the G20. There is little reason 
why deliberations on matters of  global economic governance should proceed in the format of  an informal 
and self-appointed club of  countries. A much more promising approach would be to embed the diplomacy 
of  civil servants and the concert of  head of  state in the existing institutional framework of  the Bretton 
Woods institutions and their procedures and frameworks for binding multilateral agreements.  
…but there is no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater 
The existing system of  multilateral deliberation and arbitration on matters of  global economic governance 
– notably in the form of  the IMF and the World Bank – is fraught with difficulties. From the perspective 
of  effective global economic governance for the 21st century, the two main deficiencies of  the Bretton 
Woods system that needs to be addressed are the following: 
 There is no Heads-of-State forum, and hence the Bretton Woods suffers from a lack of  ‘political 
weight’ when the rubber hits the road 
 Its systems of  voting power do not adequately recognise the increased economic and political 
weight of  dynamic emerging market economies  
The absence of  a Heads-of-State forum in the Bretton Woods system is a massive deficiency. In this sense, 
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the Bretton Woods system is profoundly anachronistic. In the meetings of  the IMFC, the governing body 
of  the IMF, the permanent absence of  Heads of  State is not conducive to deliberations on delicate matters 
of  global economic governance such as global imbalances. With a pending ‘currency war’, in the words of  
Brazilian finance ministers Guido Mantega (Wheatley and Garnham 2010), little was achieved during the 
IMF’s Annual Meetings in October, apart from agreeing to wait and see what the G20 leaders might be 
able to do during the Seoul summit a month later. 
With regard to voting power in the Bretton Woods systems, dynamic emerging market economies feel 
grossly underrepresented and it is not difficult to understand why. Prior to the ongoing voice reform in the 
World Bank, China and India together had approx 40 pct more voting power than the aggregate of  
Belgium and Netherlands (5.56 compared to 4.01), despite having a more than six times larger aggregate 
share of  GDP (12.60 compared to 1.97, cf. see table 5). The World Bank voice reform of  spring 2010 
changed the relative distribution of  voting power in favour of  dynamic emerging market economies, but 
not much - and again the comparison of  China and India with the Netherlands and Belgium is illustrative. 
Although the aggregate voting power of  China and India is now double that of  Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the relative voting power of  these two sets of  countries is entirely out of  line with their 
relative shares of  GDP.  
Table 5  The voting power of  dynamic emerging market economies in perspective 
 GDP (nominal, in 
pct of  world total) 
GDP (PPP, in pct 
of  world total) 
GDP * (60/40, 











































Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 2008-data. See Appendix A for the full data set. 
To reflect shares of  GDP, China and India would need to have at least six times as much voting power as 
Belgium and the Netherlands.17 It is not difficult to understand the dissatisfaction of  dynamic emerging 
market economies with the voting power systems of  the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Despite these deficiencies of  the Bretton Woods system, the answer is not to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. The faith in the G20 was predicated on the illusory belief  that global solutions would somehow 
                                               
17 This depends, of course, on the GDP indicator chosen. If measured in terms of GDP at market values the voting power of China 
and India should be roughly four times larger than that of Netherlands and Belgium (9.5/2.29=4.1), while if measured at 
purchasing power parity values, their voting power would have to be almost eleven times larger (16.6/1.56=10.6) 
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be easier arrived at in a ‘flexible’ forum outside the established institutional framework of  the Bretton 
Woods institutions. One should not forget, however, that informal fora are flexible not just for oneself, but 
also for all the other involved parties. In a sense, it is precisely this much praised ‘flexibility’ that is the root 
cause of  the ineffectiveness of  the G20: the flip-side of  ‘flexibility’ is the non-binding nature of  the 
deliberations that take place. The way forward is to reform the Bretton Woods institutions so as to allow 
them to operate effectively as key pillars in a multilateral system of  global economic governance, under the 
stewardship of  a Global Economic Council.  
Before explicating in more detail this proposed revision of  the Bretton Woods system a brief  engagement 
with a certain scepticism with proposals of  this nature is warranted.  
Are binding forms of  global economic governance even more prone to failure? 
Some would argue that binding forms of  multilateral cooperation has failed at least as much as non-
binding forms and that binding arrangements generally are difficult to arrive at, cumbersome to manage, 
and slow in operation. Critics often mention the WTO as a key example of  this, not least in light of  the 
current deadlock of  the Doha Round. While the Doha stalemate is certainly highly unfortunate, one should 
not forget that trade agreements is the single most successful area of  post-WW2 global economic 
governance. The underlying reason for the current standstill in the WTO is not so much that a finalized 
Doha agreement would be binding for the parties, as it is the ongoing reconfiguration of  global economy – 
and the reluctance on the part of  developed countries to accept that the terms of  the game are changing.    
Many would be delighted, in the current era of  severe global imbalances, if  there was a similar level of  
binding agreements and dispute settlement mechanisms in the areas of  international financial flows and 
macroeconomic policies, as there is in trade. Indeed, the establishment of  a dispute settlement mechanism 
for exchange rate controversies was precisely what Simon Johnson, former Chief  Economist at the IMF, 
proposed as the only way to resolve the exchange rate controversy between the US and China.     
The Obama-administration has strived to make the agenda of  addressing these ‘global imbalances’ a key 
issue of  the ongoing G20 deliberations. The US is particularly frustrated with Chinese exchange rate policy 
– which is seen to be severely undervalued, and hence a key cause of  these ‘global imbalances’ – and of  the 
massive loss of  jobs in America. The Chinese, on the other hand, see these issues quite differently. So 
where do we find the IMF in all this? Let me quote a news report from the Wall Street Journal last week. It 
is highly illustrative: 
Unlike the US government…, who see China’s reluctance to allow its currency to rise against the dollar as 
an impediment to rebalancing the world economy, Mr. Strauss-Kahn [Director of the IMF] shied away 
from criticizing the Chinese government for its handling of the currency. The value of the Chinese yuan 
against the US dollar, he said, is “one index but I’m not sure it’s the only one (WSJ, 4 November 2009).  
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The fact that the Director of  the IMF abstains from taking sides with the US on this crucial issue shows 
you that power relations in the global economy are really changing. The IMF – commonly perceived to be 
closely aligned with US interests on central issues – is acting much more carefully vis-à-vis the rising power 
of  the global economy than it would have just a year earlier. 
On top of  the agenda is the “G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth”. The key 
word here is ‘balanced’ – as opposed to ‘imbalanced’.  In the future, no countries should run neither large 
trade surpluses nor deficits – but instead generate a balanced form of  economic growth, the underlying 
reasoning goes. The big question is, however, which mechanisms can be agreed upon to ensure that 
countries pursue policies that are reconcilable with this new paradigm of  balanced growth. For the US, the 
key issue is Chinese exchange rate policy. The Chinese, however, believes that the main cause of  current 
global imbalances is US monetary policy.  
This fundamental disagreement is what motivates proposals such as Simon Johnsons. Binding forms of  
multilateral deliberation and agreement are necessary to break the current impasse on the issues of  global 
imbalances. According to Simon Johnson, the emerging consensus in Washington is that exchange rates 
should in the future be the jurisdiction of  the WTO, not the IMF. Not only does the WTO have much 
more legitimacy, Johnson explains; it also “has agreed upon and proven tools for dealing with violations of  
acceptable trade practices” (Johnson 2010). China is more than a little unlikely to be supportive of  this 
idea. It took 15 years to negotiate China’s membership of  the WTO – and China, for cultural and other 
reasons, does not have much appetite for taking disputes to court. There is every reason, in other words, to 
expect that China will resist the idea of  making its exchange rate and economic growth policies subject to 
international dispute settlement within the WTO. But the point here is not so much whether exchange rate 
disputes could or should be dealt with in the WTO in the future. The point is rather to stress that some of  
the most pressing issues of  global economic governance lacks an institutional framework within which 
they can be effectively resolved. Such an institutional framework must be created, and it must take the form 
of  binding deliberations and agreements. By creating a global economic council, anchored in the Bretton 
Woods system, one could combine the key strength of  the WTO – the binding nature of  the agreements 
made and the many years of  experiences with dispute settlement – while reducing the potential risk of  
having this system fall into the ‘consensus trap’ of  the WTO: most decisions are taken by simple majority 
in the Bretton Woods institutions, and should also be so in the proposed Global Economic Council. Of  
course, many important issues need to be addresses in more detail than is possible in this paper, such as 
how binding agreements are to be applied, enforced and sanctioned in case of  non-compliance, and so 
forth. But irrespective of  how such issues are addressed most effectively, the current era of  globalization 
badly needs a new institutional set-up for global economic governance. 
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INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A BRETTON WOODS II 
Three key reforms are essential for establishing an institutional framework expedient to effective global 
economic governance. First, a Heads-of-State forum needs to be created, which is predicated upon the 
voting power and country constituency systems of  the Bretton Woods institutions. Second, the voting 
power systems of  the Bretton Woods institutions much be revised so that voting power come to reflect 
much better the economic weight of  its member countries. Third, the country constituencies of  the 
Bretton Woods institutions much be revised to meet the dual objective of  moving to a system of  all-
elected chairs and ensure a better balanced representation of  the world’s main regions.  
Establishing a Global Economic Council  
The cornerstone of  a revised and up-to-date Bretton Woods system should be a Global Economic 
Council. Its key task would be to act as steering committee of  the global economy in general and of  the 
Bretton Woods Institutions in particular. Ideally, the council should function as a joint Board of  Governors 
for the World Bank and the IMF and it should have a small secretariat that would help prepare its summits, 
the hosting of  should rotate among the world’s four main regions.   
The Council should consist of  twenty-five country constituencies, in an arrangement similar to that of  the 
Boards of  the IMF and the World Bank, with procedures for consultation and rotation to ensure that all 
member countries have a voice in the process in proportion to their GDP. A Global Economic Council 
based on country constituencies, with the relevant twenty-five Heads of  State meeting twice a year, on the 
basis of  prior consultation with their country constituencies, would have all the benefits of  concert and 
multilateral legitimacy. Moreover, it would have the advantages of  being embedded in and calibrated with 
the existing institutional framework, in and around the IMF and the World Bank.  
The Council should deliberate on key issues with regard to the further reform of  the governance 
arrangements of  the existing Bretton Woods institutions, such as voice and voting power reform and 
potential capital and quota increases. But it would be natural for the Council to also have informal 
discussions global economic governance issues beyond the two Bretton Woods institution such as, for 
instance, the matter of  how new momentum may be brought to the WTO’s Doha round and whether the 
proposals by the Basel committee for a new international agreement on banking regulation are satisfactory 
and sufficient. 
Reforming the existing voting power systems 
The current systems of  voting power of  the Bretton Woods institutions do not adequately reflect the 
geopolitical realities of  the world economy. We discussed above the massive under-representation of  China 
and India vis-à-vis Belgium and Holland. The crucial question is whether this under-representation of  two 
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dynamic emerging market economies, and over-representation of  two small developed countries, is part of  
a general pattern. Consider the overview of  the voting power to GDP ratios for some of  the major 
shareholders of  the Bretton Woods institutions provided in Table 6 below.  
What the voting power to share of  GDP ratio tells use you is basically how much voting power you get in 
the World Bank or the IMF for 1 pct share of  world GDP. Three factors cause these ratios to deviate from 
one (share of  voting power equals share of  GDP). First, the allocation of  basic votes to all countries 
independently of  their GDP. Second, the inclusion of  other criteria than GDP in allocating quota shares, 
such as contributions to IDA in the case of  the World Bank and indicators for ‘openness’ and ‘economic 
variability’ in the case of  the IMF. Third, processes of  ‘political engineering’ that have given some countries 
a higher share of  voting power than they would be eligible for on the basis of  the principles agreed upon.18 
The first of  these factors is negligible as basic votes as a share of  total votes has eroded over the years 
from the original level of  10 pct to little more than 2 pct today. The other two factors give rise, however, to 
rather substantial variations in the voting power to GDP ratios, as shown in Table 6 above. Indeed, some 
of  these variations are so big that it is difficult to accept and appreciate the voting power systems of  the 
Bretton Woods institutions. 
Does it not, for instance, constitute a significant problem for the legitimacy of  the governance of  the 
World Bank that China gets only 0.47 pct of  voting power for 1 pct share of  GDP while Belgium gets 2.19 
pct voting power for 1 pct share of  GDP? Is it reasonable that Saudi Arabia has a voting power to GDP 
ratio of  almost 4 in the IMF, while voting power to GDP ratios of  Brazil, China, India and Turkey are all 
below 0.6 pct.?  
What these data convey is that the oft-cited principle that voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions 
should reflect countries economic weight in the global economy is theory more than practice. It is of  
paramount importance to the legitimacy of  the Bretton Woods institutions that their voting power systems 
are revised in a manner that restores a fundamental balance between voting power and GDP. Further, a 
revision of  voting power allocation for the Bretton Woods system, including the Global Economic 
Council, should restore basic votes at 10 pct of  total votes, and make provisions that this level is 
maintained through an annual, automatic adjustment process. This revision would entail excluding all other 
criteria than GDP in the allocation of  quota shares.  
 
                                               
18 For more on this in the case of the World Bank, see Vestergaard (2011a). 
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Table 6  Voting power to GDP ratios in the World Bank and the IMF 
World Bank IMF 
Country Share of  GDP* Share of  voting 
power 
VP to GDP 
ratio 
Share of  voting 
power 
VP to GDP 
ratio 
US 22.27 15.85 0.71 16.74 0.75 
China 9.32 4.42 0.47 3.65 0.39 
Japan 7.22 6.84 0.95 6.01 0.83 
Germany 5.26 4.00 0.76 5.87 1.12 
France 4.03 3.75 0.93 4.85 1.20 
UK 3.90 3.75 0.96 4.85 1.24 
Italy 3.35 2.64 0.79 3.19 0.95 
Russia 3.34 2.77 0.83 2.69 0.80 
India 3.28 2.91 0.89 1.88 0.57 
Brazil 2.76 2.24 0.81 1.38 0.50 
Spain 2.41 1.85 0.77 1.38 0.57 
Canada 2.20 2.43 1.11 2.88 1.31 
Mexico 2.02 1.68 0.83 1.43 0.71 
S. Korea 1.68 1.57 0.94 1.33 0.79 
Australia 1.46 1.33 0.91 1.47 1.01 
Turkey 1.32 1.08 0.82 0.55 0.42 
Netherlands 1.25 1.92 1.54 2.34 1.87 
Indonesia 1.04 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.91 
Poland 0.92 0.73 0.79 0.63 0.69 
Iran 0.82 1.47 1.79 0.69 0.84 
Saudi Arabia 0.81 2.77 3.44 3.16 3.92 
Belgium 0.72 1.57 2.19 2.08 2.91 
Switzerland 0.68 1.46 2.14 1.57 2.30 
Sweden 0.68 0.85 1.25 1.09 1.61 
Argentina 0.66 1.12 1.70 0.96 1.45 
Norway 0.60 0.58 0.97 0.76 1.26 
Thailand 0.59 0.49 0.83 0.50 0.84 
Austria 0.59 0.63 1.07 0.85 1.44 
South Africa 0.57 0.76 1.32 0.85 1.48 
Greece 0.54 0.33 0.61 0.38 0.71 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2008-data. 
 
The proposal to exclude all non-GDP criteria will likely be unwelcome in countries that currently carry a 
voting power to GDP ratio that is significantly higher than 1, including a number of  small European 
countries, such as Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and a few DTCs such as Saudia Arabia and South 
Africa. They will likely argue that voting power ought to reflect other factors than just GDP. The issue of  
 31 
what other elements than GDP should be added is a highly contentious one, however. When small 
European countries argue, for instance, that significant contributions to IDA should give rise to higher 
voting power in the World Bank, they should be aware that others might argue that it is about time that the 
size of  countries’ population is given weight in the allocation of  voting power. Indeed, if  other criteria than 
GDP were to be added to a revised formula, one could easily imagine more relevant ones than ‘openness’ 
or contributions to IDA. An obvious candidate to would be some indicator that captures the geopolitical 
power that comes with the economic dynamism of  rising emerging market economies such as China and 
India. In fact, in both the 2008 IMF quota and voice reform and in the 2010 IBRD voting power 
realignment one of  the elements of  the GDP component was a so-called ‘PPP booster’ intended precisely 
to “to give additional recognition to dynamism of  economic growth” (DC 2010a: 7).19 Of  course, such an 
economic dynamism component can be specified in many different ways. The point here is that as long as 
developed countries grant themselves additional IMF quota shares and IBRD shareholding on the basis of  
such criteria as ‘openness’, ‘economic variability’ and IDA contributions, emerging market countries are 
likely to insist on special provisions for economic dynamism. 
The IMF often prides itself  that voting power in the institution is predicated upon a quota formula based 
on objective criteria. However, the phenomenon of  politically determined quotas that are then justified ex 
post “by reference to ostensibly neutral formulae specifically designed to produce the intended results” 
dates back to the founding of  the Bretton Woods institutions (Woodward 2007: 5). In the case of  the IMF, 
it was Raymond Mikesell who produced the formula for the initial allocation of  quotas in 1943, under the 
instructions of  Harry Dexter White, chief  negotiator of  the US. Mikesell later reported on how he 
answered questions about how the figures were arrived at: 
I… gave a rambling twenty-minute seminar on the factors taken into account in calculating the quotas, but 
I did not reveal the formula. I tried to make the process appear as scientific as possible, but the delegates 
were intelligent enough to know that the process was more political than scientific (Mikesell 1994: 35-36) 
What this paper proposes is a formula that is so simple that it is not really a formula. The proposal is to 
simply allocate to countries a share of  total quota votes that equals their share of  world GDP. This is the 
best way to ensure that relative voting power reflects the realities of  the global economy while at the same 
time avoiding all manner of  resource- and time-consuming political battles in and around a more or less 
complex quota formula.  
The voting power system proposed would have three main elements. First, that all countries agree to 
                                               
19 In the case of the World Bank, the ‘PPP booster’ gave countries whose “PPP-based weight in the world economy” was 
“30 pct or more above their IBRD shareholding a total increase in shareholding percentage of at least 10 pct” (DC 2010a: 
7). 
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abandon whatever claims they feel they legitimate have for the inclusion of  other criteria than GDP in the 
allocation of  voting power, in favour of a revision that give all countries, including a number of  grossly 
under-represented DTCs, their fair share of  voting power as measured by their share of  world GDP. 
Second, that a composite measure of  GDP is used, giving roughly equal weight to GDP at market values 
and GDP at purchasing power values.20 Third, that the relative voting power of  low-income countries is 
increased by restoring basic votes at the original level of  10 pct of  total votes.   
Revision of  system of  country constituencies 
It is important that the country constituencies of  the Global Economic Council are the same for the global 
economic council and for the governing bodies of  the IMF and the Bank. Since the existing configuration 
of  country constituencies in the World Bank and the IMF is in need of  serious repair, fundamental 
revision of  country constituencies must be undertaken. New principles are needed both for the allocation 
of  chairs among regions and for the allocation of  chairs within regions.  
The first principle of  allocation of  chairs among regions should be to achieve reasonable representation of  
all the world’s main regions, first and foremost to remedy the inadequate representation of  African 
countries in both the Bretton Woods institutions and the G20 as currently configured. The first task to 
undertake in achieving this is carving the world up in its main regions. This paper proposes basing future 
global economic governance arrangements on four main regions: Africa; Asia; Americas and Australasia; 
and Europe.  
Table 7  The world’s four main regions 21 
 GDP (nominal) 
(billion USD)  
GDP (PPP) 




(pct. of  total) 
Africa 1440 2847 2003 3.23 
Americas & Australasia 20608 22570 21393 34.55 
Asia 16525 27357 20858 33.69 
Europe  17678 17638 17662 28.53 
Total 56251 70411 61916 100 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 2009-data.  
 
Sixteen seats in the council should be distributed evenly among each of  these four main regions; four seats 
                                               
20 This could be either the 60-40 weighting used both in the 2008 IMF quota review and in the current quota framework developed 
for the IBRD shareholding realignment (see Vestergaard 2011a), or simply a 50-50 weighting.  
21 The total numbers reported for GDP are not the same as the numbers provided by the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) for aggregate World GDP. The aggregate world numbers are bigger than what is calculated above. This is 
related to the procedure of imputing missing values for aggregate calculations when producing WDI data. 
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for each region.  
The second principle should be that nine additional seats are assigned to the four regions in proportion to 
their relative weight of  the world economy. At current GDP shares (see table below), this would mean that 
all three regions except Africa would get three additional seats. Together, the application of  these two 
principles would give Africa four seats and the three other regions seven seats each. 
Table 8  GDP* and the allocation of  seats in revised Bretton Woods system 
 GDP* 
(pct. of  total) 
GDP seat 
indicator 
Allocation of  
GDP seats 
Regional seats Total number 
of  seats 
Africa 3.23 0.30 0 4 4 
Americas & Australasia 34.55 3.11 3 4 7 
Asia 33.69 3.03 3 4 7 
Europe 28.53 2.57 3 4 7 
Total - 9 3 16 25 
 
The allocation of  chairs within the four different regions should be based on the following two main 
principles.22 First, country constituencies should be elected chairs, with a minimum size of  three countries 
per constituency. This would break with the current ‘mixed-system’ of  five appointed chairs and nineteen 
elected chairs. This principle of  elected chairs means that all countries within a region may put forward 
their candidacy for one of  the region’s chairs. In order to do so, however, the country must form an 
alliance with at least two other countries. Within each region, countries would then vote in proportion to 
their GDP. In the case of  Asia, for instance, the seven largest of  such country constituencies formed – in 
terms of  the aggregate representation they mobilize through regional voting – get the seven Asian chairs.  
Second, all chairs should involve a mechanism of  rotation to ensure consultation and dialogue within 
constituencies. Each constituency could have one Director and two Alternates, and decide internally 
whether there should be rotation on both levels or only at the level of  Alternates. This flexibility in 
rotation modalities would allow large economic powers – such as the US and China – to maintain 
Directorship of  a chair, while ensuring consultation with countries in their constituency through the 
system of  Alternates. In polarized country constituencies, comprised of  a group of  large countries along 
with a group of  smaller countries, the larger countries could choose to rotate the Directorship among 
themselves while the smaller countries of  the constituency rotate at the level of  Alternates.  
To briefly summarize, the proposed reforms would revise and reboot the existing Bretton Woods 
                                               
22 The decision to move to an all-elected Board has been taken for the IMF and is scheduled to be implemented over the next few 
years (IMF 2010). 
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institutions, while putting them under the stewardship of  a Global Economic Council. The governing 
bodies of  the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the Global Economic Council, would be based on a new 
set of  twenty-five elected country-constituencies ensuring a more balanced representation of  the world’s 
main regions and voting on the basis of  voting power systems that much better reflect their relative 





“Given the broad impact of  our decisions”, the G20 proclaimed in Seoul, “[we] recognize the necessity to 
consult with the wider international community”, and we pledge to bear in mind “the importance of  the 
G20 being both representative and effective as premier forum for our international economic cooperation” 
(G20 2010b: 17). This paper has argued that the G20 so far have been both ineffective and illegitimate, not 
least in pursuing its self-proclaimed role of  ‘steering committee’ for the global economy, and more 
importantly, that it is ill-suited to address the global economic governance challenges of  the 21st century. A 
major shortcoming of  the G20 in this respect is that it has no capacity or institutional framework that 
enables negotiation and arbitration of  a formal and binding nature.  
The way forward in global economic governance is to revise the existing Bretton Woods system in a 
manner that addresses its weaknesses and makes it responsive to the geopolitical realities of  a rapidly 
changing global economy. The major deficiency of  the existing Bretton Woods system is that it lacks a 
Heads of  State forum that meets twice a year to deliberate and negotiate on matters of  global economic 
governance. The first key challenge is thus to establish a Heads of  State forum that is both legitimate and 
effective to take over the role currently strived for by the G20. While a Heads-of-State forum is a sine qua 
non for effective global economic governance in the 21st century the G20 is by far the right solution. The 
G20 is fundamentally illegitimate, not least by permanently excluding 172 countries from its deliberations 
and decision-making. Moreover, the G20 is ineffective on the crucial issues. Contrary to popular conception 
the G20 creates a dilution of  global economic governance rather than a strengthening of  it. The way to 
strengthen global economic governance is to create a genuine steering committee for the global economy, 
in a manner that both mirrors the legitimacy constructs of  Bretton Woods Institutions and brings them 
up-to-date through an in-depth reform process.  
The creation of  a Global Economic Council, in which all member countries of  the Bretton Woods 
institutions are represented through a system of  country constituencies, is hence proposed. This council 
should be firmly embedded in the existing institutional arrangements of  the Bretton Woods institutions, 
which must thus be reformed accordingly. A total of  twenty-five country constituencies should be allowed, 
as is now the case in the governing bodies of  the IMF and the World Bank.23 In allocating these twenty-five 
seats among and within the worlds four main regions (Africa; The Americas & Australasia; Asia; and 
Europe) the following two criteria should apply: (i) significant and balanced representation of  all the 
world’s four main regions, and (ii) differentiation on the basis of  the four regions’ aggregate share of  GDP. 
Sixteen seats should be distributed equally among the four regions (four seats to each region), while the 
                                               
23 The IMF has 24 chairs while the World Bank has 25, as a consequence of the recent decision to add a third African chair in the 
Bank (see Vestergaard 2011).  
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remaining nine seats should be distributed among the regions in accordance with their aggregate share of  
world GDP. At current levels of  GDP, this would result in four seats for Africa and seven seats for each of  
the three other regions. Within regions, constituencies should be formed on the basis ‘elections’ in which 
countries ‘vote’ in proportion to their GDP, much as is the case in the governing bodies of  the IMF and 
the World Bank currently. 
The three major advantages of  such a reconfiguration of  global economic governance would be that (i) it 
would embed a Leaders’ forum within the institutional framework of  the existing Bretton Woods 
institutions while at the same time bringing the latter up to date, (ii) it would reconfigure the current 
country constituencies so that all chairs represents at least three and no more than 16 member countries; 
(iii) it would give long-term durability to global economic governance because the system would be 
responsive to the rise and fall of  nations and regions in and through a transparent, automatically updated 
system of  weighted voting (based on GDP), while ensuring at the same time a certain level of  inter-
regional legitimacy and stability by means of  the proposed balanced allocation of  chairs to all the world’s 
regions.  
A Bretton Woods system revised along these lines would not only allow for a better balance between 
established and rising powers, and hence a more durable way of  changing the governing balance as the 
economic balance changes, it would also more likely be effective than an informal G20 Leaders forum 
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